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COMMENTS AND CRITICISM
FUNCTION ATTRIBUTIONS DEPEND ON THE EXPLANATORY
CONTEXT: A REPLY TO NEANDER AND ROSENBERG’S
REPLY TO NANAY*
In “A Modal Theory of Function,” I gave an argument against allexisting theories of function and outlined a new theory.1 Theargument, briefly, is that all existing theories of function define
the function of a token trait in terms of some properties of some
other (past, present, future) traits of the same type. They define
the function of my heart in terms of some properties of other hearts
(say, the hearts of my ancestors). Hence, these theories need to give
an unproblematic and noncircular account of trait-type individua-
tion: of what makes hearts hearts. But, I argue, the least problematic
accounts of trait-type individuation appeal to the traits’ function—
thus, we cannot use them as part of the definition of function with-
out running into circularity.2 My positive account is that we need
to define the function of a token trait with the help of modal
claims—in terms of what this very token trait would do if things were
somewhat different. In short, my suggestion is that we should define
function in modal terms.
Karen Neander and Alex Rosenberg argue against both my nega-
tive and my positive claims.3 My aim here is not merely to defend
my account from their objections, but to (a) very briefly point out
that the new account of etiological function they propose in response
to my criticism cannot avoid the circularity worry and, more impor-
tantly, to (b) highlight, and attempt to make precise, an important
feature of my modal theory that may have been understated in the
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original paper—that function attributions depend on the explanatory
project at hand.
Neander and Rosenberg argue that if we formulate the theory of
etiological function properly, then the trait-type individuation objection
could be avoided. The general gist is as follows. Trait tokens form
lineages: the lineage to which my heart belongs, for example, also
includes my mother’s heart, my daughter’s heart, and so on. These
lineages can be parsed according to the selection pressures operating
on them: if there is selection for doing F at a certain part of a lineage,
then the traits in that part of the lineage have the function to do F.
And if there is selection for doing F at a certain part of a lineage, then
the traits in that part of the lineage all count as belonging to the same
trait type. In short, there is no circularity here: both function and trait-
type individuation “co-supervene” on the selection processes operating
on the lineage.4
The problem with this argument is that lineages themselves could
not be identified without talking about trait types. Take, as an exam-
ple, my heart. It is on the same lineage as my mother’s heart. But
when we say so, we already identify an organ in my mother’s body
as a heart: as a token of the type that my heart is also a token of.
Hence, Neander and Rosenberg have a problem; if the identification
of the lineage presupposes an appeal to trait types, then the circularity
worry has not gone away. If function supervenes on the parsing of
lineages according to selection pressure and lineages themselves are
identified by means of trait types, then the definition of function
presupposes trait-type individuation. We cannot use functional cri-
teria for individuating trait types without running into circularity.
The circularity worry applies to Neander and Rosenberg’s new
account of function as much as it does to the original version of the
etiological theory.
If we want to avoid this circularity, we need to define the function
of a token trait in terms of the properties of this very token trait only.
And I see no way of doing so other than by endorsing the modal
theory of function. This theory may have some unusual features,
but the alternative, as far as I can see, is to dispose of the concept
of function altogether because of circularity.
Neander and Rosenberg also argue against my positive account,
the modal theory of function. According to the modal theory
of function, the function of a trait depends not on the history of
traits of the same kind, but on the modal properties of this very
4 Ibid., p. 617.
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trait. The only way of avoiding the trait-type individuation objection
is to define the function of a token trait with reference to the prop-
erties of this token trait only—without talking about other traits of
the same type. But if we want to (and we do need to) allow for the
possibility of malfunctioning—for the possibility that this token trait
has the function to do F but fails to do F at the moment—we need
to appeal not only to this token trait’s actual properties but also
to its modal properties when defining its function.
The definition of function I gave is the following:
Performing F is a function of organism O’s trait x at time t if and only if some
‘relatively close’ possible worlds where x is doing F at t and this contributes to O’s
inclusive fitness are closer to the actual world than any of those possible worlds
where x is doing F at t but this does not contribute to O’s inclusive fitness.5
I left the notion of “relatively close possible world” explicitly open.
I pointed out that depending on the explanatory project at hand,
we need to consider different sets of “relatively close possible worlds.”
What counts as “relatively close” in one explanatory project will not
count as “relatively close” in another. As function attribution depends
on the explanatory project at hand, a claim Neander and Rosenberg
explicitly agree with,6 this flexibility of considering different sets
of possible worlds to be “relatively close” accounts for this variation
of function attribution in different explanatory projects.
Neander and Rosenberg argue that my account gives the wrong
prediction about some function attributions. Their example is the
function of the mechanism that is responsible for lactose intolerance
in a lactose-intolerant individual. They say that I am forced to con-
clude that this mechanism has the function to digest lactose but is
malfunctioning. And this is the wrong conclusion to draw because
“it is normal for [this individual], given his ethnicity, to have adult
lactose intolerance.”7
The case, they argue, generalizes: take a trait that can do F at the
moment but at some time in the future will be able to do F *, which
is much more fitness enhancing than F. They claim that I am forced
to conclude that the function of this trait is F * already now because
doing F * would contribute to the organism’s inclusive fitness. That
is, there is a “relatively close” possible world where this trait is doing
F * and this contributes to the organism’s inclusive fitness, and this
possible world is closer to the actual one than any possible world
5Nanay, “A Modal Theory of Function,” p. 422.
6 Neander and Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 614. See also their footnote 3.
7 Ibid., p. 616.
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where this trait is doing F * and this does not contribute to the
organism’s inclusive fitness. But this is wrong: the trait does not now
have the function to do F *.
What Neander and Rosenberg seem to overlook in this argument
is that the set of possible worlds we need to consider when deter-
mining the function of a trait depends on the explanatory project
at hand. Suppose that x has an intrinsic property (or set of intrinsic
properties) I and operates in environment E. It has the function to
do F. Now, suddenly (as a result of a mutation), the intrinsic property
of x changes to I *. If x were to live in an environment E *, it could
do F *, which is much more fitness enhancing than F. Question:
what is the function of x now?
The answer is that this depends on the explanatory project at
hand. If we are interested in the intrinsic properties of x, say, the
differences between I and I *, we should keep the environmental
factors fixed when considering “relatively close possible worlds.”
Those possible worlds where the environment is different from the
actual one are not considered to be “relatively close” for the pur-
poses of this explanatory project. Thus, possible worlds with E* are
excluded from the set of “relatively close possible worlds.” But then
the function of x will be to do F—it is not the case that there is a
“relatively close” possible world where x does F * and this contributes
to the inclusive fitness of the organism. (It is also not the case that
this world is closer than any possible world where x does F * and this
does not contribute to the inclusive fitness of the organism.)
But if we are interested in the various things the new intrinsic
property, I *, allows x to do, then we should keep the intrinsic prop-
erties of x fixed when considering the set of possible worlds for
the purposes of determining x ’s function. Those possible worlds
where x has I will not count as “relatively close” in this explanatory
project. But possible worlds where the environment is E* could
count. Thus, in this explanatory project, x’s function will be to do
F *. There is a “relatively close” possible world where x does F *
and this contributes to the inclusive fitness of the organism, and
that world is closer than any possible world where x does F * and this
does not contribute to the inclusive fitness of the organism. The
variability of the scope of “relatively close possible worlds” in my
definition is not a bug—it is a feature.8
Note that the same argument applies if we swap the intrinsic and
the environmental factors: if x ’s environment changes suddenly
8 I made the same general point in my “A Modal Theory of Function” on
pp. 425–26—and Neander and Rosenberg seem to be in agreement with that argument.
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to E * and, while x has the intrinsic property I at the moment, if it
were to have I *, it could do the fitness-enhancing F *. If we keep the
environment fixed (say we are interested in how this new environ-
ment could influence the organism’s fitness), then x does have the
function to do F *. If we keep x’s intrinsic properties fixed (say we
are interested in the anatomy of x in a range of different environ-
ments), then x will not have the function to do F *—there will be
no “relatively close” possible world where x does F *. It seems that
Neander and Rosenberg only consider explanatory projects of the
latter kind when they argue against my account. But in the case of
these explanatory projects, the modal theory yields the very same
conclusion that they find intuitive: x does not have the function to
do F *. But there are some explanatory projects of the former kind,
where we hold fixed the environmental and not the intrinsic fea-
tures of x. In these cases, the modal theory does entail that x has
the function to do F *. Crucially, my account allows for this variation in
function attribution, depending on the explanatory project at hand—
something of which Neander and Rosenberg explicitly approve.
bence nanay
University of Antwerp and
University of Cambridge
comments and criticism 627
